The root of many of these institutional issues is the lack of reform in many cities. The reform movement in the later 1880's and early 1900's saw the rise of city managers and professionalization. Many cities did not reform or like Cleveland used the perception of reform to continue political machine type politics. Many perceive mayors as the epitome of democracy but the office of mayor is a political gateway to a political career at state and national levels. Ambition needs to be linked to institutions not individual careers. Ambition and definitions of democracy that do not understand government can undercut institutions. Having a professional such as a city manager reporting to an elected council that can fire her without cause is more democratic than electing a mayor who can control the local politics for ambition.
You raise an important perspective. The Progressive Era reforms reflected the idea that professional administration could reduce patronage and make government more competent and impartial. This said, whether a city is best served by a strong mayor or a council-manager system is a question on which thoughtful people disagree. My larger point is that no governance structure is self-executing. Even well-designed institutions require transparency, accountability, competence, and integrity if they are to earn public confidence. Those qualities, more than the formal structure itself, are what sustain institutional legitimacy.
Bob, the city management movement was a democratic movement based on the short ballot and proportional representation. John Brennan and I just finished a manuscript for our book under contract with the Kansas University Press on the founding of public administration. The founding period was from the late 1880's to the federal reforms under FDR in 1940. The reform at the local level focused on democracy not professional management. And professional management was to be responsive to the voters and council. We reviewed some interesting dialogs between city managers and democratic reformers such as Richard Childs. By ignoring history public administration was painted as a management rather than a political movement.
That's a valuable clarification. If I've understood you correctly, you're arguing that the original reformers weren't trying to replace politics with management; they were trying to create institutions that better translated democratic accountability into competent administration. That history actually reinforces my larger point that institutional legitimacy depends not only on integrity but also on institutional design. Thank you for adding that perspective.
Do you think we've lost something important by forgetting those democratic origins? -- Bill
We lost the notion that political reform at the local level was a movement for democratic politics coupled with ethical public administration. Public administration is part of democratic politics and that is important to counter notions of bureaucracy. The result is more robust institutions in government. Note a city manager could be, and still can be, fired without cause. All political authority is in the council as there is no separation of powers. Separation of powers is a necessity at the federal level, an option at the state level and non-democratic at the local level. Ohio is a great example where separation of powers confuses accountability. As Ohio government is very partisan a parliamentary system would hold parties more accountable. However, given the general lack of knowledge about political philosophy and politicians not wanting to change a system that has worked well for parties, especially Republicans in recent decades, reform of Ohio government is a non-starter. Enjoy the dialog.
A final comment is that an astute student of public administration noted that the concept of public administration was not part of politics was a ploy used by reformers so that Rockefeller funding for reform did not set off alarms. The Rockefeller funding was quite important during the founding of PA and funneled through the Spelman Foundation and reformers such as Charles Merriam.
I think we have "shadow" cities and towns - where, unlike Chicago, little scrutiny happens of shady deals around town. Stamford, CT stands as one example. It's home to Purdue Pharma and WWF. The firm where I worked - Gartner- went downhill and is now subject to a major stock fraud allegation. In shadow cities, there's no stakeholder tier keeping their eyes on things.
Another town in this "shadow" group: Arlington, outside of Boston. The major law firm is prominent in the town Center. But this same firm is regularly drawing state Bar investigations and rebukes. In another development, four city leaders are currently trying to sell a Girl Scout camp for $18 million dollars by breaking the original Trust. No town leader will say anything or discuss it publicly.
In Chicago, people speak up and they remember. In shadow cities, bad behavior takes place in plain sight, and there's a lack of stakeholders to hold people accountable.
I think you're pointing to an important factor. My essay asserts that institutional legitimacy is maintained, not simply assumed. This is implied by a combination of my evolutionary systems theoretic view of cities and towns, and simply keeping up with the news. Accordingly, my expectation would be that communities with vigorous local journalism, engaged citizens, and organizations willing to scrutinize public decisions would often have stronger accountability. Conversely, where those institutions are weak, citizens may come to believe that decisions are being made without meaningful public oversight. Whether this perception is always accurate is less important than the fact that it shapes public trust.
The root of many of these institutional issues is the lack of reform in many cities. The reform movement in the later 1880's and early 1900's saw the rise of city managers and professionalization. Many cities did not reform or like Cleveland used the perception of reform to continue political machine type politics. Many perceive mayors as the epitome of democracy but the office of mayor is a political gateway to a political career at state and national levels. Ambition needs to be linked to institutions not individual careers. Ambition and definitions of democracy that do not understand government can undercut institutions. Having a professional such as a city manager reporting to an elected council that can fire her without cause is more democratic than electing a mayor who can control the local politics for ambition.
Larry:
You raise an important perspective. The Progressive Era reforms reflected the idea that professional administration could reduce patronage and make government more competent and impartial. This said, whether a city is best served by a strong mayor or a council-manager system is a question on which thoughtful people disagree. My larger point is that no governance structure is self-executing. Even well-designed institutions require transparency, accountability, competence, and integrity if they are to earn public confidence. Those qualities, more than the formal structure itself, are what sustain institutional legitimacy.
Best,
Bill
Bob, the city management movement was a democratic movement based on the short ballot and proportional representation. John Brennan and I just finished a manuscript for our book under contract with the Kansas University Press on the founding of public administration. The founding period was from the late 1880's to the federal reforms under FDR in 1940. The reform at the local level focused on democracy not professional management. And professional management was to be responsive to the voters and council. We reviewed some interesting dialogs between city managers and democratic reformers such as Richard Childs. By ignoring history public administration was painted as a management rather than a political movement.
That's a valuable clarification. If I've understood you correctly, you're arguing that the original reformers weren't trying to replace politics with management; they were trying to create institutions that better translated democratic accountability into competent administration. That history actually reinforces my larger point that institutional legitimacy depends not only on integrity but also on institutional design. Thank you for adding that perspective.
Do you think we've lost something important by forgetting those democratic origins? -- Bill
We lost the notion that political reform at the local level was a movement for democratic politics coupled with ethical public administration. Public administration is part of democratic politics and that is important to counter notions of bureaucracy. The result is more robust institutions in government. Note a city manager could be, and still can be, fired without cause. All political authority is in the council as there is no separation of powers. Separation of powers is a necessity at the federal level, an option at the state level and non-democratic at the local level. Ohio is a great example where separation of powers confuses accountability. As Ohio government is very partisan a parliamentary system would hold parties more accountable. However, given the general lack of knowledge about political philosophy and politicians not wanting to change a system that has worked well for parties, especially Republicans in recent decades, reform of Ohio government is a non-starter. Enjoy the dialog.
A final comment is that an astute student of public administration noted that the concept of public administration was not part of politics was a ploy used by reformers so that Rockefeller funding for reform did not set off alarms. The Rockefeller funding was quite important during the founding of PA and funneled through the Spelman Foundation and reformers such as Charles Merriam.
I think we have "shadow" cities and towns - where, unlike Chicago, little scrutiny happens of shady deals around town. Stamford, CT stands as one example. It's home to Purdue Pharma and WWF. The firm where I worked - Gartner- went downhill and is now subject to a major stock fraud allegation. In shadow cities, there's no stakeholder tier keeping their eyes on things.
Another town in this "shadow" group: Arlington, outside of Boston. The major law firm is prominent in the town Center. But this same firm is regularly drawing state Bar investigations and rebukes. In another development, four city leaders are currently trying to sell a Girl Scout camp for $18 million dollars by breaking the original Trust. No town leader will say anything or discuss it publicly.
In Chicago, people speak up and they remember. In shadow cities, bad behavior takes place in plain sight, and there's a lack of stakeholders to hold people accountable.
Susan:
Thank you for the thoughtful comment.
I think you're pointing to an important factor. My essay asserts that institutional legitimacy is maintained, not simply assumed. This is implied by a combination of my evolutionary systems theoretic view of cities and towns, and simply keeping up with the news. Accordingly, my expectation would be that communities with vigorous local journalism, engaged citizens, and organizations willing to scrutinize public decisions would often have stronger accountability. Conversely, where those institutions are weak, citizens may come to believe that decisions are being made without meaningful public oversight. Whether this perception is always accurate is less important than the fact that it shapes public trust.
Bill